The U.S. proposal to establish a military presence at an airbase near Damascus is a welcome sign of deepening cooperation with Syria’s new government, but it may be insufficient to secure regional U.S. interests. A Damascus presence should complement—not replace—the U.S. partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF, which remains essential to preventing a resurgence of the Islamic State, or ISIS, and constraining Iranian activity.
The ISIS challenge is concentrated in northeastern Syria, where detention facilities hold about 9,000 ISIS fighters and family members. Nearly 85 percent of the fighters are held in two prisons near Hasakah and Shaddadi. These facilities are vulnerable targets, as shown by the 2022 Hasakah prison break that took two weeks to contain, even with U.S. air and intelligence support. The SDF, aided by U.S. funding and training, has carried the primary burden of physically securing these sites for more than a decade.
But the threat extends beyond the northeast’s detention sites. In March, an ISIS suicide bomber attacked a church in Damascus, killing 25 and injuring 63. Syrian authorities recently disrupted two ISIS plots targeting President Sharaa and arrested more than 70 ISIS suspects in nationwide raids. And the ISIS-inspired attack in New Orleans in January—along with multiple arrests of ISIS-inspired Americans in recent months—illustrates the group’s continued ability to radicalize individuals far beyond Syria. These developments underscore why maintaining pressure on ISIS and supporting local partners remains essential.
The United States should continue to build on the “by, with, and through” partnership that has made the SDF the most effective counter-ISIS force in Syria. Sustaining this relationship—through training, intelligence sharing, and support to detention operations—is the best way to prevent ISIS from reconstituting. It also signals to regional partners that the United States remains committed to a stable transition in Syria rather than stepping back prematurely.
At the same time, Washington must push for greater international burden-sharing in managing detained ISIS fighters. Only 36 countries have repatriated any nationals from northeast Syria, while 21 have yet to begin. Prolonged detention increases the risk of radicalization and creates a long-term humanitarian and security challenge for the region. Iraq’s repatriation of roughly 25,000 citizens—about 80 percent of Iraqis detained in Syria—demonstrates what committed action can achieve. The United States should apply the same diplomatic urgency it uses in negotiating criminal deportation agreements to secure fiscal contributions and accelerate repatriation efforts, easing pressure on the SDF and reducing the long-term threat posed by these populations.
Broader counterterrorism objectives also depend on preventing Iranian rearmament of Hezbollah, which would destabilize the region. Israeli intelligence reports indicate that the group has begun restoring supply lines through Syrian territory. Although Iran and Hezbollah have suffered setbacks—and Russia’s diminished role has further constrained their operating space—Tehran continues to seek opportunities to rebuild its networks.
This makes it vital for the United States to sustain its partnership with the SDF, which, according to the Lead Inspector General for Operation Iraqi Freedom, currently controls most Iraqi-border crossings in eastern Syria—positioning it as the first line of defense against the flow of Iranian weapons into Lebanon. Beyond the SDF partnership, Washington should work with the Syrian government and Israel to disrupt these flows. Washington’s provision of intelligence, deconfliction, and diplomatic coordination to the Syrians and Israelis can complicate and disrupt Iran’s efforts. Strengthening these channels of cooperation with the new Syrian government is especially important now as Syria seeks to consolidate control and demonstrate its independence from Tehran.
Syria’s shift away from Iran and Russia and toward greater cooperation with Western partners presents a strategic opportunity. The government has a vested interest in limiting extremist groups, restoring security, and preventing Syria from becoming a conduit for Iranian influence. Its decision to join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS demonstrates a willingness to work with international partners, and the Interior Ministry has already carried out joint counter-ISIS missions with U.S. troops. This alignment of interests remains nascent, but it offers a real chance for the United States to advance both counterterrorism priorities and regional stability.
ISIS prison breaks and Iranian rearmament are preventable, but averting them requires sustaining the SDF partnership, advancing international burden sharing, and countering Iranian weapons flows. Leaving before Syria can stand on its own will not end America’s involvement in the country—it will simply set the stage for a more costly return.
Thomas Bergeson, a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant general, served as deputy commander of U.S. Central Command. He participated in the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s 2023 Generals and Admirals program.
Jonah Brody is a policy analyst at JINSA.
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