In October, President Donald Trump stated that the United States would resume nuclear testing “immediately,” a claim he made as the U.S. had adhered to a voluntary moratorium since 1992.
Nearly three months later, it is not clear what, if anything, has been done to advance the president’s intent.
His brief announcement nonetheless sent the arms control community into an apoplectic frenzy. Critics deem a resumption of testing unnecessary and certain to trigger a new arms race. Neither claim withstands scrutiny, but they have succeeded in diverting attention away from common sense arguments in favor of testing.
The claim that testing is unnecessary places great weight on the annual certification process in which the nuclear weapons laboratories attest to the “safety, reliability, and performance” of the arsenal.
Though informed by advanced computer simulations, the annual certifications ultimately reflect human judgments which, by their very nature, are susceptible to error. They do not provide proof that the weapons, some of which contain components nearly 50 years old, will function as intended. Only real-world testing can provide such certainty.
Yet the annual certifications are taken as gospel by the anti-test crowd. This is an odd way to think about any complex mechanical device — nuclear or otherwise — that involves thousands of component parts. Nobody would entrust their family’s safety to an emergency home generator that has been “certified” to work but not fully tested in over three decades.
The charge that a resumption of U.S. nuclear weapons testing would unleash another “arms race” is another false narrative.
U.S. State Department reports indicate Russia — and most likely China — have conducted low-yield nuclear explosive tests. Senior Russian officials have publicly admitted doing so.
Moscow and Beijing evidently believe testing is necessary to ensure the reliability of their own arsenals. And they have undertaken them in the absence of U.S. testing, which lays bare the fallacy of the action-reaction dynamic implied by the “arms race” metaphor.
Critics of nuclear testing often point out that the U.S. conducted just over one thousand tests — far more than China or Russia — prior to suspending the drills in 1992. However, they fail to add that only a fraction of those tests are relevant to assessing the health of today’s arsenal.
The world has changed dramatically — and clearly for the worse — since the U.S. last conducted an underground test.
The feel-good vibes that characterized U.S.-Russian relations in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War have long since dissipated. Multiple attempts to “reset” the relationship have since failed. Moscow has relentlessly modernized its nuclear arsenal, developing exotic weapons such as a transoceanic nuclear-armed torpedo, while pursuing its expansionist ambitions in Georgia, Syria, Ukraine and elsewhere.
It would be dangerous enough if the U.S. just had to face one powerful nuclear adversary, as it did during the Cold War, but this is no longer the case with the growth of Chinese military power.
For decades after China’s first hydrogen bomb test, Beijing appeared content to maintain a small number of nuclear weapons. Not anymore. China’s wide-ranging nuclear expansion is on a growth trajectory projected to rival America’s arsenal in less than a decade.
The president’s instincts are correct. The case for resuming nuclear weapons testing is stronger now than ever, given the deterioration of the security environment and the uncertainties inherent with assessing the health of an aging nuclear arsenal.
It is odd, indeed, to require every weapon in the U.S. arsenal be fully tested except for the nuclear weapons on which our ultimate deterrent rests.
Getting the U.S. ready to test after more than 30 years of not doing so is no small feat. The required infrastructure and technical know-how have atrophied. The nuclear labs need to proceed with a sense of urgency and develop plans. For its part, Congress must adequately fund their efforts and ensure resources are not siphoned away from other critical strategic modernization programs.
Even a limited resumption of testing will require extensive planning and preparation, including the construction of underground cavities to limit environmental impacts. Building such facilities from scratch will take time — which is all the more reason to begin now.
James H. Anderson and David J. Trachtenberg both formerly served as deputy and acting under secretaries of defense for policy during the first Trump Administration.
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