Despite the recent ceasefire between Iran and the United States, the Islamic Republic continues to restrict shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. In response, the United States has established its own naval blockade in the strait and sends thousands more troops to the region. All of this follows multiple threats from President Trump, including one promising to destroy Iran’s civilization. These threats have failed to open the Strait of Hormuz, which had been open prior to the joint U.S.-Israeli attacks.
Why didn’t the president’s maximalist threats work? Indeed, his bombastic form of diplomacy appears to have undermined the prospects for peace between the United States and Iran. To understand why Trump has failed to change Iran’s behavior, it is necessary to examine his approach to diplomacy.
Trump relies on a version of the “madman theory” in many of his disputes. His approach resembles a distorted, MAGA version of Theodore Roosevelt’s famous maxim – that is, scream loudly and swing a big golf club.
In practice, it often amounts to boisterous threats without a clear or credible strategy behind them.
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And despite the president’s rather novel use of the theory, it does have a sketchy if unsuccessful history.
While President Nixon’s political aide, H. R. Haldeman, popularized the term “madman theory,” it was developed more fully by economist and deterrence theorist Thomas Schelling and military analyst Daniel Ellsberg. The madman theory is a deterrent technique, to be used in limited circumstances: it signals to an adversary, “Do not take this action, or the consequences will be severe.”
To succeed, however, the adversary must believe the threat will be carried out. The more frequent or outlandish the threats, the more the madman’s credibility deteriorates. Success stories of the madman theory are few and far between. Richard Nixon signaled that he would use nuclear weapons against North Vietnam in 1969 to bring it and the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. It failed. Nikita Khrushchev’s nuclear blackmail were unconvincing for NATO forces to withdraw from West Berlin. Saddam Hussein cultivated ambiguity about weapons of mass destruction to deter Iran and the United States from invading. And that story did not end well for him.
Given its lackluster record, it is unclear why policymakers continue to rely on this approach.
Besides the madman theory being flawed, the U.S. lacks the will and capabilities to back up President Trump’s threats. Iran’s leadership is likely aware of the American people’s unwillingness to fight another ground war in the Middle East.
Trump’s threat to destroy Iran produced massive backlash from the American public, including his base. Such public disapproval of madman behavior undermines its credibility and effectiveness. What’s more, American munitions are in short supply and rapidly depleting.
Take Tomahawk cruise missiles. In just slightly over four weeks, the United States launched about 850 of these missiles against Iran out of the total 3,100 missiles in its inventory, and only produces around 90 missiles per year. These two facts already rendered Trump’s threats kaput.
Trump’s frequent use of bombastic rhetoric further erodes that credibility. He has issued sweeping threats across multiple contexts—from “fire and fury” toward North Korea to threatening to withdraw from NATO, as well as to “take” Greenland. Over time, this creates a “boy who cried wolf” dynamic, making it difficult to take his most worrisome threats seriously.
Compounding the problem is Trump’s misapplication of the madman theory itself.
Trump continues to tell Iran, “Do this, or I’ll blow up everyone.” This rhetoric reflects what Schelling described as “compellence”—an effort to force an adversary to change its behavior—rather than deterrence, which seeks to prevent an action in the first place. But compellence is typically more difficult to achieve, as it requires the target to abandon the status quo, of which humans are psychologically inclined to prefer. Deterrence, by contrast, reinforces it. This distinction helps explain why threats that might prevent an action often fail to reverse one already underway.
President Trump’s overuse and misapplication of the madman theory has placed the United States in a difficult position. The risk of deeper involvement in the Middle East is rising at a time when the margin for error in U.S. foreign policy is limited. Yet the current approach offers few clear pathways to either de-escalation or success.
The United States is stuck with an inept form of coercion in its war with Iran—one that generates heat but no leverage. Trump’s use of the madman theory has failed to produce security or stability. It has only revealed the madness of America’s current policy towards Iran.
Benjamin Giltner is a Policy Analyst in defense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute, where he works on issues related to U.S. military strategy and foreign policy, great-power competition, nuclear weapons and deterrence.
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